








Criminalising Fabricated Images of Child Pornography: A Matter of 
Harm or Morality?  
Suzanne Ost*  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Certain provisions within the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (C&JA) have resulted 
in significant revisions to the criminal law and justice system and have thus 
understandably attracted media coverage and legal commentary.1 However, 
there is one offence that has received surprisingly scant attention. Following hot 
on the heels of the recent criminalisation of extreme pornography,2 the offence 
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 For example, the provision that introduced a Sentencing Council for England and Wales which 
imposes guidelines for judges (s.118), and the provision which removed the requirement of the 
defendant’s consent to the use of a live link for a preliminary hearing of her/his case (s.106). See 
‘Judges Group Attack Sentence Plan’ BBC News, 25 March 2009,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7963321.stm; A Turner, ‘Criminal Justice Legislation’ (2010) 
174(12) Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 162; ‘Coroners and Justice Bill’ (2009) 65 Magistrate 13; 
‘Thousands of Criminal Suspects to be Tried in Virtual Courts’ The Times, 18 May 2009; Law 
Society, ‘Law Society warns against removal of consent to hearings by ‘virtual court’, Press 
Release, 27 January 2009, 
http://www.lawsocietymedia.org.uk/site.php?s=1&content=35&press_release_id=1034&mt=34. 
Unsurprisingly, unsuccessful amendments to the Coroners and Justice Bill (C&JB) to change the 
law on assisted suicide also attracted media attention. See, for example, ‘Hewitt Seeking Suicide 
Law Change’, BBC News, 20 March 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7953570.stm; 
‘Hewitt Leads Call to Protect Suicide Helpers’, The Independent, 20 March 2009; ‘Assisted Suicide 
Ban Forcing Terminally Ill to Die Early, Lords told’, The Guardian, 2 June 2009; ‘Change in Assisted 
Dying Law Rejected’, BBC News report, 7 July 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/8139621.stm. All web pages last visited 3 January 2010.  
2
 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (CJIA), s.63. Extreme pornographic images are 
defined as ‘pornographic images that depict acts which threaten a person's life, acts which result 
2 
 
criminalises non-photographic pornographic images of children (NPPIC). That is, 
fantasy visual representations of child pornography in the form of, for example, 
computer generated images, cartoons or drawings.  Such images are not 
prohibited by existing offences relating to indecent photographs of children, 
which only extend to images that are photographic, or appear to be photographic 
in nature, or are derived from a photograph.3 The Government’s intention to 
make NPPIC unlawful became clear in 2007, following the publication of a Home 
Office Consultation Paper.4 In this document, two primary harm based arguments 
were utilised to legitimate criminalisation: first, that NPPIC may be used to groom 
children and, secondly, that they could ‘fuel abuse of real children by reinforcing 
potential abusers’ inappropriate feelings towards children’.5  
 
What is especially noteworthy is that the proposal to criminalise NPPIC 
was not made as a consequence of any research which demonstrated that such 
visual depictions are harmful. Indeed, in the Consultation Paper, it was stated 
that: 
 
We are unaware of any specific research into whether there is a link 
between accessing these fantasy images of child sexual abuse and the 
commission of offences against children, but it is felt by police and 
                                                                                                                                                                       
in or are likely to result in serious injury to a person's anus, breasts or genitals, bestiality or 
necrophilia’. See Explanatory Notes to the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (2008), para 
43; CJIA, s.63(7); C McGlynn and E Rackley, ‘Criminalising Extreme Pornography: a lost 
opportunity’ [2009] Criminal Law Review 245. 
3
 See below nn 15, 16, 67 and 70.  
4
 Home Office, Consultation on the Possession of Non-photographic Visual Depictions of Child 
Sexual Abuse (London: Home Office, 2007). 
5
 Ibid, p 5.  
3 
 
children’s welfare organisations that the possession and circulation of 
these images serves to legitimize and reinforce highly inappropriate 
views about children.6 
 
It is apparent, then, that the stated justification for the offence was the possible 
harm that may be caused to children. As I will discuss, the Government has taken 
the same route as the US Congress, by adding to laws that protect morals to 
criminalise material that cannot be caught under existing legislation relating to 
indecent photographs of children.  However, this move cannot be justified by 
relying on the classical liberal harm based rationale for prohibiting real images of 
child pornography. It cannot be argued that primary harm has been caused to the 
children who feature in the photographs, which is exacerbated by the knowledge 
that their abuse is recorded in images made available to others to view because, 
in the case of fantasy NPPIC, no real child has been abused.7 Yet the Government 
still considered the offence to be the next essential step in extending the legal 
protection offered to children from behaviour that is connected (directly or 
remotely) to sexual abuse.8  
 
This should not come as a surprise. We live in a society in which children 
are categorised and distinguished as a special vulnerable group, as victims in 
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 Ibid, p 1. 
7
 As I will discuss, the exception to this is where the NPPIC is a manipulated real photograph of 
child pornography or depicts real child sexual abuse. 
8
 For example, at the beginning of the second reading of the C&JB in the House of Commons, the 
Secretary of State, Jack Straw, stated that: ‘In the past 10 years, we have developed much greater 
protection for children from sexual abuse, but we must keep the law up to date with 
technological changes. The Bill therefore provides for a new offence of possession of non-
photographic images of child sex abuse, building on the existing law in respect of indecent 
photographs.’ Hansard, HC Deb, 26 January 2009: column 35.  
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need of protection. Child sexual abuse and related acts are, understandably, 
seen as particularly grievous evils from which society must endeavour to protect 
children.9 In fact, the protectionist discourse surrounding children and sexual 
abuse has become so compelling that it is difficult to respond objectively when 
we perceive children to be at threat; we have reached a point where any 
behaviour that is connected to any form of child pornography is automatically 
considered to be harmful.10 However, whilst it would be extremely difficult to 
claim that an individual who creates real child pornography11 or disseminates 
such material has not caused harm to children, in the case of possessing NPPIC, 
the individual concerned may not have caused any direct harm to children by 
his12 actions. 
 
In this paper, I contend that a stronger case for criminalisation would have 
existed had the Government directed the new offence to NPPIC depicting real 
                                                          
9
 See, for example, M Kleinhans, ‘Criminal Justice Approaches to Paedophilic Sex Offenders’, 
(2002) 11 Social and Legal Studies 233. 
10
 See S Ost, Child Pornography and Sexual Grooming: Legal and Societal Responses (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), pp 10-11. 
11
 By the phrase ‘real child pornography’, I mean material which features the sexual abuse of real 
children. 
12
 When referring to possessors of NPPIC, I use the masculine pronoun throughout this paper 
since the existing research indicates that the majority of individuals who use child pornography 
are male (see MC Seto and AW Eke, ‘The Criminal Histories and Later Offending of Child 
Pornography Offenders’ (2005) 17(2) Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment 201, p 
203). However, this is certainly not to say that only men engage in such activities. Note the 
charges of sexual assault and making, distributing and possessing indecent images of children 
brought against nursery worker Vanessa George in 2009, who subsequently pleaded guilty to the 
offences and received an indeterminate sentence. One of the two co-defendants in the case was 
also female. For a history of the case, see ‘Nursery School Worker on Charges of Child Porn Meets 
Parents’ Anger Face to Face’, The Guardian, 11 June 2009; ‘The Hidden Truth’, The Guardian, 12 
June 2009; ‘Nursery worker names sex victims’ BBC News, 29 October 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/devon/8331284.stm. Last visited 3 January 2010; 
‘Sentencing date for nursery worker paedophile’, The Independent, 11 November 2009; ‘Vanessa 
George jailed for child sex abuse’, The Guardian, 15 December 2009.  See also ‘It’s not just men 
who abuse’, The Guardian, 10 November 2009. For clarity of exposition, I use the feminine 
pronoun when referring to the child. 
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child sexual abuse, or featuring real children. I should note at the outset that I 
adopt a liberal, Millian approach in my analysis.13 Thus, I start from the premise 
that it is only when behaviour causes harm to others that there is a valid reason 
to limit liberty through criminal prohibition. Essentially, my position is that harm 
may be caused to children by NPPIC that are depictions of real child sexual 
abuse, or of the fantasy sexual abuse of a real, recognisable child. Hence, 
criminalisation of the creation, distribution and possession of these images is 
justified on the basis of the harm principle.14 And adopting a broader notion of 
harm, since creating and distributing NPPIC (including completely fabricated 
images) encourages the propagation of harmful attitudes towards children, 
criminalisation of such behaviour can also be justified according to a harm based 
rationale. However, it is extremely difficult to find a legitimate basis for 
criminalising the possession of fantasy, completely fabricated NPPIC through a 
reasoned application of the classical liberal harm principle. Morality based 
rationales for prohibiting NPPIC may be raised, but ultimately they fail to 
convince unless it is accepted that either legal moralism or moral paternalism are 
acceptable grounds for criminalisation, a position that liberalism rejects. I begin 
this paper by outlining the new offence before considering morality and harm 
based rationales for prohibiting the possession of NPPIC. This leads me to 
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 JS Mill, On Liberty in JS Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative 
Government (London: Orion, 1993), p 69. 
14
 That is, Mill’s avoidance of harm principle: ‘The object of this Essay is to assert one very simple 
principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of 
compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, 
or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are 
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their 
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised 
over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.’ Ibid, p 78. 
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suggest two ways in which the offence could have been framed to better target 
harm. Finally, I highlight specific elements of the offence which I conceive to be 
problematic. It is my contention that the offence is overbroad and vague and 
that its potential violation of privacy, freedom of expression and the principle of 
legal certainty raises concerns which cannot simply be alleviated by claiming it is 




THE NEW OFFENCE 
 
The new offence can be found under sections 62-68 of the C&JA. As with the 
existing offences relating to indecent photographs of children under the 
Protection of Children Act 1978 (PCA),15 and Criminal Justice Act 1998 (CJA),16 the 
provisions focus on the character of the image. Rather than being indecent, the 
image must be ‘grossly offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene 
character’. In addition, the image must be ‘pornographic’, that is, its nature 
means it must ‘reasonably be assumed to have been produced solely or 
principally for the purpose of sexual arousal’.17 These character requirements of 
NPPIC are identical to those of extreme pornographic images under the CJIA.18 
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 Under s.1 of the PCA, it is an offence to take or permit to be taken an indecent photograph of a 
child, to distribute or show such a photograph, to have such a photograph in one’s possession 
with a view to distribution, or to publish any advertisement that conveys that the advertiser 
distributes or shows such photographs or intends to do so. 
16




 Above n 2. 
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Significantly, the provisions also define what are termed as ‘prohibited images’, 
unlike the PCA and CJA offences, which leave the question of whether 
photographs of children are indecent to the jury, through an application of 
recognised standards of propriety.19 Besides meeting the character requirements 
stated above, the image must either focus ‘solely or principally on a child’s 
genital or anal region’,20 or portray any of the following acts: 
 
a) the performance by a person of an act of intercourse or oral sex with 
or in the presence of a child; 
b) an act of masturbation by, of, involving or in the presence of a child; 
c) an act which involves penetration of the vagina or anus of a child with 
a part of a person’s body or with anything else; 
d) an act of penetration, in the presence of a child, of the vagina or anus 
of a person with a part of a person’s body or with anything else; 
e) the performance by a child of an act of intercourse or oral sex with an 
animal (whether dead or alive or imaginary); 
f) the performance by a person of an act of intercourse or oral sex with 
an animal (whether dead or alive or imaginary) in the presence of a 
child.21 
 
Moving or still images produced by any means are caught by the offence,22 so 
this encompasses computer generated images, cartoons and drawings, for 
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example. This is where the offence clearly differs from the offence relating to 
extreme pornographic images under the CJIA, which must be ‘explicit and 
realistic’ and consequently would not include cartoons, drawings or paintings.23 
Moreover, a prohibited image of a child for the purpose of the offence includes 
‘an image of an imaginary child’.24 Therefore, it is made fundamentally clear in 
the provisions that they will apply to NPPIC that do not depict real children and 
thus that the child sexual abuse featured in NPPIC does not need to have actual 
victims.  
 
The same defences are outlined as those available in respect of the offence 
of possession of indecent photographs of children under the CJA.25 The maximum 
penalty is lower than the CJA offence, being three years’ imprisonment on 
conviction on indictment, in contrast to five years under the CJA.26 The reason for 
this was explained in the Consultation Paper: indecent photographs of children 
are more harmful to children than NPPIC.27 Thus, indecent photographs and 
pseudo-photographs of children (the latter being photographs that are not real 
images of child sexual abuse, but may involve the manipulation of a real child’s 
image and tend to be computer-generated) are excluded from the ambit of the 
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 S.65(2)(a). Or data capable of conversion into an image (s.65(2)(b)). 
23




 That the individual had a legitimate reason for possessing the image, or that he had not seen 
the image and had no reason to suspect it was a prohibited image, or that the image was sent to 
him without any request, and that he did not keep it for an unreasonable time (s.64), and see the 
CJA, s.160 (2)(a), (b) and (c). 
26
 S.66. The maximum sentence on summary conviction is six months’ imprisonment. 
27
 Home Office, above n 4, pp 4 and 9. 
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offence.28 From the outset, it would seem that the Government was careful to 
differentiate between indecent photographs of children and NPPIC, because of 
the easily verifiable and serious harm caused by the former.29 To ensure the law 
reflects this difference, the offence includes the higher standard of obscenity30 
and a lower penalty, in comparison with the legislation on indecent photographs 
of children.  
 
Perhaps the Government noted the course of action taken by the American 
Federal Government to ensure that virtual child pornography was caught by the 
law. When the extension of the US Code’s child pornography provisions to virtual 
child pornography failed to withstand constitutional challenge because the 
Supreme Court held that such images do not bear an intrinsic relationship to the 
sexual abuse of real children,31 Congress added a new obscenity provision to the 
US Code through the PROTECT ACT 2003. This provision prohibits obscene visual 
representations (of any kind, including drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or 
paintings), of the sexual abuse of children which depict minors engaged in 
sexually explicit conduct.32 Therefore, the Government may have chosen to take 
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 S.65(3). An ‘image which forms part of a series of images contained in a recording of the whole 
or part of a classified work’ is also excluded from the ambit of the offence. See s.63. 
29
 ‘It is the case that cartoons, drawings and material created entirely by manipulation of 
computer software do not harm real children in the same way as taking indecent photographs of 
children...’ Home Office, above n 4, p 4.  
30
 ‘The material causing concern depicts serious child sexual abuse, going beyond the indecency 
threshold for photographs which is appropriate where real children are, or appear to be, 
involved.’ Home Office, above n 4, p 5. 
31
 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 535 US 234 (2002); Ost, above n 10, pp 206-207; K 
Duncan, ‘Child Pornography and First Amendment Standards’ (2007) 76 Mississippi Law Journal 
677, p 684. 
32
 § 1466A(a)(1). See also § 1466A(a)(2), which criminalises ‘an image that is, or appears to be, of 
a minor engaging in graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse, or sexual intercourse, 
including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the 
same or opposite sex’ and lacks ‘serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value’. 
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a leaf out of Congress’ book, placing NPPIC within the category of obscenity 
rather than indecency in order to achieve what it would have failed to do through 
the existing law on child pornography. This might explain the wording chosen by 
Secretary of State Jack Straw during the second reading of the C&JB, with 
reference to the provisions: ‘We seek all the time to ensure that what this House 
and the public regard as obscene, objectionable and extremely pornographic and 
corrupting is covered by the law…’33 It is interesting that the Secretary of State 
elected to focus on moral harms that NPPIC are perceived to cause, and it is to 
the crucial matter of harm that I now turn. 
 
 
WHAT EXACTLY IS THE HARM OF NPPIC? 
 
1. Morality based arguments 
 
Rather than focusing on concrete harm in the sense of injury or a setback to 
someone’s interests, morality based rationales for prohibition are premised upon 
threats to morality, whether this is an individual’s personal morality, the moral 
sensibilities of others, or the shared morality of society. The arguments I consider 
here primarily involve morality in the first two of these senses, since these are 
the morality based rationales stated or indicated by the NPPIC offence.  
 
a) Offence to others 
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The inclusion of the character descriptors of ‘grossly offensive’ or ‘disgusting’ for 
the prohibited image suggests that the wrong caused by possessing NPPIC is 
offence to others.34 Here, I turn to Feinberg’s comprehensive analysis of offence 
to consider whether criminalisation of possessing NPPIC is justified because such 
behaviour generates disgust and a high level of revulsion. Feinberg presents the 
following as a principle that would legitimate the criminal law’s intervention on 
the basis of offence: ‘It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal 
prohibition that it would probably be an effective way of preventing serious 
offense (as opposed to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor, and that 
it is probably a necessary means to that end’.35 For Feinberg, this liberal offence 
principle is directed towards wrongful offending, that is, offending which violates 
the rights of those who are offended.  But even though the offence principle is 
directed at preventing a wrong, it does not provide as persuasive a basis for 
criminalisation as a principle based on harm, for ‘the offended mental state in 
itself is not a condition of harm. From the moral point of view, considered in its 
own nature (apart from possible causal linkages to harmful consequences), it is a 
relatively trivial thing.’36  
 
To ascertain whether behaviour causing offence can be criminalised 
through an application of the offence principle, Feinberg suggests that the 
                                                          
34
 See also, in the context of the offence of possessing extreme pornography, McGlynn and 
Rackley, above n 2, p 252.  
35
 J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Offense to Others (Oxford University Press, 
1985), p 1. 
36
 Ibid, p 3.  
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legislator balance the seriousness of the offence against the reasonableness of 
the behaviour in question.37 Certain behaviour may cause an especially serious 
level of offence. Feinberg presents five characteristics of what he terms 
‘profound offence’: such offence is serious and deep; simply the idea of the 
behaviour occurring, even in private, causes offence; the behaviour offends the 
individuals who perceive it, not just their sensory perceptions; since the 
behaviour violates standards of propriety and moral sensibilities, it offends 
individuals because they believe it to be wrong; and finally, profound offence 
tends to be impersonal, that is, the individuals offended do not usually perceive 
themselves to be the victims of the behaviour.38 Given the strength of moral 
sensibilities towards child sexual abuse and images of such abuse, a strong case 
could be made that the offence caused by NPPIC meets all these characteristics 
and is therefore profound offence. Indeed, images would not be prohibited 
under the provisions unless they are ‘grossly offensive’. However, before it can 
be concluded that this profound offence legitimates criminalisation on the basis 
of the offence principle, it is also necessary to consider the nature of the 
behaviour relating to NPPIC that the provisions criminalise.  
 
Crimes relating to offence, outrage and disgust tend to include a public 
element, or at least some kind of exposure to others, such as the common law 
offences of outraging public decency39 and the statutory offences of public 
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 Ibid, chapter 8. 
38
 Ibid, pp 58-59. 
39




display of indecent matter40 and sending an indecent article through the postal 
system.41 Profound offence could be caused, for instance, if NPPIC were placed 
on a billboard in a public place, or leaflets including such images were posted 
through people’s letterboxes.42 However, the provisions criminalise the private 
possession of NPPIC. This is an important matter when considering the 
reasonableness of the behaviour causing offence. The actor could argue, for 
instance, that the behaviour is important to him because it is an exercise of his 
individual liberty to possess and look at such images in the privacy of his own 
home. He might also argue that the freedom to possess NPPIC deters him from 
committing actual contact offences and thus, that there is a social value to his 
possession of NPPIC.43  
 
But should such potential reasonableness be outweighed by the seriously 
high level of offence the behaviour causes? The argument would have to be that  
criminalisation is still justified because it profoundly offends others simply to 
know that individuals can possess NPPIC, even though they are not presented 
with these images and do not know where they are being possessed. This, the 
‘bare knowledge problem’, is a matter considered by Feinberg.44 Adopting 
Feinberg’s analysis, it is significant that apart from exceptional cases, bare 
                                                          
40
 Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981, s.1(1). 
41
 Postal Services Act 2000, s.85(3). I am not including offences relating to indecent photographs 
of children here. Whilst they exist within a moral framework of indecency, they are aimed at 
targeting a harm rather than mere offence. See further Ost, above n 10, pp 83-89. 
42
 See generally HLA Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1963), p 45. 
43
 See M Taylor and E Quayle, Child Pornography: An Internet Crime (Hove: Brunner-Routledge, 
2003), pp 90-91. The importance of the behaviour to the actor and whether it has a social utility 
are two standards that Feinberg suggests in order to assess the reasonableness of the offensive 
conduct (Feinberg, above n 35, pp 37-38).  
44
 Ibid, pp 60-71. 
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knowledge offence does not constitute a wrong to those offended. As Feinberg 
explains: ‘The offended party experiences moral shock, revulsion, and 
indignation, not on his own behalf of course, but on behalf of his moral principles 
or his moral regard for [the matter in question].’45 Thus, bare knowledge offence 
does not normally constitute ‘wrongful offence’, since individuals who are 
offended do not have their rights violated; they are not the victims of the 
behaviour. This is clearly the case regarding the possession of NPPIC; it is 
individuals’ moral principles and their moral regard for children that cause them 
to be profoundly offended by NPPIC, rather than any affront felt because they 
see themselves as the victims of the behaviour.46 This can be contrasted with, for 
example, homosexual hate speech that occurs in private meetings. As a member 
of the insulted group, a homosexual individual might herself or himself feel 
personally offended at the bare knowledge that this speech is occurring in 
private.47 Since bare knowledge offence regarding the private possession of 
NPPIC is not a wrong to the individuals offended, the offence principle cannot 
extend to prohibit it, even though the offence caused may be profound.48 
Therefore, criminalisation of this behaviour can only be justified on the basis of 
offence if we accept that the criminal law can intervene on the basis of legal 
                                                          
45
 Ibid, p 68. 
46
 A possible exception could be profound offence caused to individuals who have themselves 
been victims of pornography and sexual abuse when they were children, but I do not anticipate 
that this would normally be the reason why the possession of NPPIC could cause most individuals 
to experience profound offence. 
47
 Feinberg gives the examples of racist mockery and the viewing of abusive adult pornography in 
a private setting as exceptional cases where bare knowledge offence can wrong the individual 
offended who is a member of the insulted group. Feinberg, above n 35, pp 69-70. 
48
 In the words of Hart: ‘a right to be protected from the distress which is inseparable from the 
bare knowledge that others are acting in ways you think wrong, cannot be acknowledged by 
anyone who recognises individual liberty as a value.’ Hart, above n 42, p 4. See also Mill, above n 
13, pp 150, 152, 167. 
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moralism,49 which I have already noted would be at odds with the liberalist 
tradition.50 Not least, this is because criminalising behaviour on the basis of legal 
moralism is likely to lead to expansive infringements of liberty.51   
 
b) Depravity and corruption 
 
As McGlynn and Rackley have observed in the context of the offence of 
possessing extreme pornography, the inclusion of the term ‘obscene character’ 
in defining what can amount to a pornographic image makes a connection to the 
OPA.52 Thus, the decision as to whether an image is pornographic under the 
NPPIC offence may be made utilising the OPA’s ‘deprave and corrupt’ test. That 
is, does the image have a tendency to deprave and corrupt its likely audience?53 
Indeed, a clear link was made to the OPA in the summary of responses to the 
Home Office’s 2007 consultation: ‘It is not our intention to criminalise possession 
of material… which would not fall foul of the Obscene Publications Act. To that 
                                                          
49
 Feinberg, above n 35, p 69. The principle of legal moralism is that it is appropriate to prohibit 
immoral conduct even when it does not cause harm or offence to others; that is, ‘victimless’ 
immorality is a matter the law should be concerned with, because it is one of the functions of law 
to enforce morality.  
50
 See, for instance, J Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harmless Wrongdoing 
(Oxford University Press, 1988), p 145. For an absorbing liberal defence of legal moralism, 
however, see Michael Moore, Placing Blame (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
51
 When referring to a theory of social rights which would enable all individuals to demand state 
action against any individual who does not act ‘in every respect exactly as he ought’ and thus 
weakens and demoralises society, Mill states that ‘so monstrous a principle is far more dangerous 
than any single interference with liberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not 
justify’. Mill, above n 13, pp 158. 
52
 McGlynn and Rackley, above n 2, p 252. 
53
 OPA, s.1. Although I should note that when this paper was at proofs stage, a Ministry of Justice 
Circular was published in which it is stated that the definition of the concept of ‘obscene 
character’ under the new provisions is ‘distinct’ from the ‘technical’ definition under the OPA 
which is ‘specifically geared to the concept of publication’. Ministry of Justice, Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 (Provisions coming into force on 6 April 2010), Circular 2010/06 (2010), para 18. 
Whilst this might indicate that the deprave and corrupt test will not be employed, I submit that 
the OPA test may still be looked to for guidance because obscenity is such an ambiguous concept. 
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end we envisage the offence having a third element to it, namely that the 
material caught is of an obscene character.’54 Essentially, the ‘deprave and 
corrupt’ test reflects a personal corrupting moral harm argument rather than an 
‘offence to others’ claim.55 The harm in question relates to the repercussions of a 
negative alteration to an individual’s moral character, caused by coming into 
contact with the material in question.56 But it is not necessary to establish that 
the depravity and corruption actually lead to bad conduct.57 It is possible to apply 
this moral harm argument beyond the individual by contending that if the state 
fails to act against this depravity and corruption, then gradually the moral 
attitudes of others will also be altered so that we become dessensitised to the 
material in question and society’s shared morals are thus at threat.58 
 
The possible utilisation of the depravity and corruption test in the context 
of the NPPIC offence raises a significant concern. The OPA is directed at the 
publication and dissemination of obscene material; there must be an audience to 
deprave and corrupt in order for the person who publishes or otherwise 
disseminates the material to cause this moral harm. However, the possessor of 
NPPIC is not committing this moral harm by merely possessing the images for his 
own purposes. In the context of the NPPIC offence, it is thus necessary to take 
                                                          
54
 Home Office, Consultation on the Possession of Non-Photographic Visual Depictions of Child 
Sexual Abuse – Summary of responses and next steps (2008), 11.  
55
 See also Feinberg, above n 35, p 171. 
56
 Although whether being corrupted constitutes harm to the individual is a contested issue. See J 
Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Others (Oxford University Press, 1984), p 
66. Contrast RP George, Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality (Oxford University 
Press, 1993), pp 226-227. 
57
 DPP v Whyte [1972] AC 849: ‘bad conduct may follow from the corruption of the mind… [but] it 
is not part of the [deprave and corrupt test] that it must induce bad conduct’ (per Lord Pearson, 
at 864). 
58
 See P Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
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this moral harm argument one step further than it is taken regarding the OPA 
offences, and to argue that criminalisation is necessary on the ground that an 
individual should be prevented from depraving and corrupting himself. This 
would be an instance of legitimating criminalisation on the grounds of ‘moralistic 
paternalism’, along the following lines: ‘it is bad (harmful) for a person to have 
impure thoughts and a depraved character whatever he may think about the 
matter, and the state has a right to protect him from his own folly by banning the 
corrupting materials.’59 But even if the application of moralistic paternalism in 
this context were acceptable in a liberal society, there is a further difficulty. 
Would the individual possessor who is the creator of the NPPIC not already be 
depraved and corrupted by his thoughts before he transfers the image that is in 
his mind onto paper, or a computer? If so, then it would only be possible to 
paternalistically protect the possessor who is not the creator of the image from 
depravity and corruption. However, the House of Lords’ judgment in DPP v 
Whyte may indicate that according to the law at least, it is possible for an 
individual to be recorrupted. With reference to the OPA, Lord Wilberforce stated 
that: ‘The Act is not merely concerned with the once for all corruption of the 
wholly innocent; it equally protects the less innocent from further corruption’.60 
Applying this to the creator of the NPPIC, it could be argued that the offence is 
protecting him from depraving and corrupting himself further by transferring his 
thoughts into an image. Yet it is questionable whether such further recorruption 
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actually occurs and, even accepting that it does, that it is a matter for the 
criminal law, since it does not cause harm to anyone else.61 
 
What the above analysis reveals is that the application of a moral harm 
argument on the basis of depravity and corruption to legitimate criminalising the 
possession of NPPIC is not straightforward. Furthermore, it should not amount to 
an appropriate basis for criminalisation unless moralistic paternalism is seen as a 
persuasive ground for restricting an individual’s private behaviour.62 And, as with 
legal moralism, this is not something liberalists would normally accept.63 
 
 
2. Arguments based on actual and potential harm to children  
 
Here, Mill’s harm principle forms the basis for possible rationalisations of the 
offence. Thus, the following arguments all revolve around the harm or risk of 
harm to children that NPPIC might represent.64 Whilst I will primarily apply a 
classical liberal harm based rationale, I will also extend my analysis of harm to a 
broader liberal humanist rationale.  
 
a) NPPIC that depict real child sexual abuse cause primary harm to children 
                                                          
61
 Unless it causes the creator to go on to commit actual child sexual abuse, but, as I discuss 
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In the Consultation Paper, the Government discussed the problem of 
manipulated real photographs of child pornography (photographs which are 
altered through computer software and made to look like cartoons or 
drawings).65 Significantly, in the case of these particular types of NPPIC, the same 
justification for criminalisation could be made as regards real images of child 
pornography, especially if a child is sexually abused in order for the original 
photographs which become NPPIC to be made. The harm caused by these NPPIC 
would be the direct harm caused to the child who features in the images. In 
addition, prohibiting the possession of real images of child pornography can be 
rationalised because the child suffers further psychological harm from the 
knowledge that other individuals are looking at the photograph of her being 
sexually abused.66 This could be extended to the possession of NPPIC that are 
manipulated real photographs of child pornography. But if part of the reason why 
others’ possession of the photograph is psychologically harmful is because the 
child can be identified (that is, she suffers harm because of the knowledge that 
others will see a recognisable image of her), then this might depend on how 
recognisable the manipulated depiction of her is. 
 
 Whilst I find this harm based argument to be persuasive because it centres 
on causing direct harm to children, it is hard to understand why a new offence 
was necessary to capture such NPPIC. This is because, in 2008, the definition of a 
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photograph for the purposes of the offences regarding indecent photographs of 
children was extended to a tracing or other image which is not itself 
photographic in nature, but is derived from a photograph or a pseudo-
photograph.67 Consequently, such images were already prohibited under the 
existing law. What the existing law did not catch were images that depict real 
child sexual abuse, but are not derived from a photograph or pseudo-
photograph. Take, for example, a drawing that records the real sexual abuse of a 
child by an adult. The same harm argument applies to such NPPIC as images 
created through the manipulation of real photographs. Yet the Government did 
not present these particular versions of NPPIC as the main material it was 
targeting. Rather, it was fantasy, completely fabricated images that were 
generally referred or alluded to in the Consultation Paper. For instance, when 
outlining the proposed penalty for an NPPIC offence, a lower penalty was put 
forward than that for possessing indecent photographs of children because 
NPPIC ‘do not depict actual abuse of a real victim’.68 The case for the offence on 
the basis of harm would have been much more compelling had it been directed 
to NPPIC that do depict the actual abuse of a real victim, or depict a real child. 
  
b) If NPPIC depict real children, then harm is caused to these children 
 
Here, I am concerned with NPPIC that are computer generated and made to look 
like actual photographs of real children. No child is sexually abused when the 
image is created, but the fantasy sexual abuse is of a real child. In explicating this 
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 S.7(4)) of the PCA, as inserted by the CJIA, s.69. 
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 Home Office, above n 4, p 9.   
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harm argument, it is useful to draw an analogy with indecent pseudo-
photographs of children, which are criminalised under the PCA and CJA.69 A 
pseudo-photograph can be created through the manipulation of an innocuous 
photograph of a child by, for instance, taking a computer generated image of an 
adult having graphic sexual intercourse with a child and superimposing a child’s 
head from a real photograph onto the child’s body within the image (what I refer 
to as a morphed pseudo-photograph).70 This image could harm the child if she 
becomes aware of the morphed photograph and suffers consequential 
psychological harm. Even if this does not occur very often, provided such harm 
results in just a few cases, this should suffice as a serious justification for 
criminalisation of the creation and dissemination of morphed pseudo-
photographs.71 Moreover, a child surely has an interest in not being defamed 
through her image.72 If her image is manipulated and presented in a distorted, 
injurious way and people who know her see the image and have their 
perceptions of her negatively altered by it,73 then this interest is set back. There 
must always be some possibility, even if slight, that someone the child knows 
could come into contact with the morphed pseudo-photograph and link it to the 
child. To apply this to NPPIC, provided that the image in question is made to look 
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like a realistic actual photograph of a recognisable child, then this harm argument 
could justify criminalising the creation and dissemination of such images. 
However, it is less forceful when applied to the possession of NPPIC, since the 
harm here is more remote. Whilst knowledge that others may want to possess 
such images might encourage creators to fabricate images of a real child, the 
possessor is not the individual whose actions cause this child’s interest to be set 
back.74 Nonetheless, it may still be possible to find a normative link to primary 
harm, in the sense that the possessor is underwriting the harm caused to the 
child by the creator of such NPPIC.75  
 
What needs to be borne in mind, however, is that the offence covers NPPIC 
featuring imaginary children. The harm arguments I have discussed here and in 
the previous sub-section are only applicable where NPPIC depict real children. 
Where the image does not depict a real child, then its creation does not cause 
harm to an actual child. Whilst Mill’s harm principle can indeed be expanded and 
manipulated,76 there has yet to be a distortion so overbroad that it could 
encompass harm to imaginary beings, as it would have to in the context of 
completely fabricated NPPIC if harm is limited to direct harm caused to the 
children who feature in the images.77 
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Redesigning and limiting the offence to NPPIC featuring real children or real 
child sexual abuse so that it better targets direct harm may not be a feasible way 
forward however; on a practical level, it would be extremely difficult for 
prosecutions to be brought in cases where it is hard to tell if particular NPPIC do 
depict the actual abuse of real victims, or depict real children.78 One possible way 
around this would be through the introduction of a defence, as I will discuss in 
the next section.  
 
c) NPPIC can be used to groom children 
 
This threat of harm was a particular concern for the Government. In its view: 
‘The offence is required to protect children. The images can be used as a 
grooming tool, preparing children for acts of abuse.’79 Studies have shown that 
child sex abusers may make use of pornographic images to groom children.80 
Significantly, the act of showing a child NPPIC would not in itself mean that the 
individual has committed the offence related to sexual grooming under the 
Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA), unless he meets or arranges to meet the child 
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following a course of sexual grooming.81 However, in light of judicial 
interpretation, the individual would in all likelihood commit the offence of 
causing a child to watch a sexual act under s.12 of the SOA, which includes 
causing a child to look at an image of a person engaging in sexual activity.82 
Furthermore, according to the Consultation Paper, the police tend to find NPPIC 
alongside indecent photographs of children.83 No evidence was put forward 
during the consultation to suggest that groomers are using NPPIC alone to 
groom. Since an individual who sexually grooms a child by showing her indecent 
photographs of children would commit offences under the PCA and the CJA,84 
then considering the applicability of these and the s.12 offences, the 
Government is not faced with a situation where other criminal laws would not 
apply. It is thus hard to make the case that without this offence, harmful 
behaviour towards children in the form of such grooming would escape the grasp 
of law. 
 
d) NPPIC encourage the objectification of children as sexual objects and thus 
advocate child sexual abuse 
 
It is surely arguable that NPPIC promote harmful attitudes towards children. 
Permitting the possession of such images encourages an acceptance of the 




 S.12. In R v. Abdullahi [2007] 1 WLR. 225, the Court of Appeal interpreted the requirement 
under s.12 that the act is carried out for the purpose of sexual gratification to apply to a future 
intended purpose and thus, provided the individual grooming the child intends to receive 
gratification from some subsequent behaviour, the offence would be made out. 
83
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representations of children that they convey: their objectification as sexual 
objects.85 Such objectification can only encourage those who desire to commit 
actual child sexual abuse.86 According to the C&JB’s Explanatory Notes: ‘Viewing 
such images can desensitise the viewer to acts of child abuse, and reinforce the 
message that such behaviour is acceptable. Banning [their] possession is justified 
in order to establish clearly and in accordance with the law that it is not.’87 This 
mirrors the view of the NSPCC that ‘the existence of these images serves to 
rationalize sexually abusive behaviour towards children in the real world and 
potentially serves to legitimise it in abusers’ minds.’88  
 
 This harm argument has parallels with feminist critiques of adult 
pornography, such as Kappler’s contention that the powerful medium of 
pornography enables the propagation of sexist, exploitative representations of 
women to a male audience.89  Although the harm of objectification and 
exploitative representations is not necessarily verifiable, it has been accepted in 
legal discourses.90 In my view, the objectification argument bolsters the case for 
prohibiting the creation and dissemination of all NPPIC, including completely 
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fabricated images which do not directly harm real children through their creation 
and dissemination, since creators and distributors are actively promoting 
attitudes that society considers to be harmful. But it is harder normatively to 
justify criminalising the possession of NPPIC on this basis, because the possessor 
is not the individual propagating the harmful attitudes.91 He would only cause 
primary harm to children if he goes on to commit actual sexual abuse. In fact, 
this was a consequence of possessing NPPIC suggested in Parliament: 
 
How can [it be said] for example, that what the [individual] may do with 
an image that he has conjured up from his imagination in the privacy of 
his own home as part of a paedophile activity, will not lead to other 
things? It seems self-evident that if somebody can get gratification from 
that sort of activity, it may be but a short step towards involving real 
images of children and real activities.92 
 
However, the causative link between viewing pornographic images and 
committing child sexual abuse is not proven.93 In response to this, it could be 
contended that the possessor indirectly causes harm to children because he is 
encouraging the market in NPPIC. In the context of virtual child pornography, 
Wasserman has argued that:  
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…the sale and possession of virtual child pornography would help 
maintain the child pornography market, which would leave open the 
financial conduit by which the creation of all child pornography is 
funded and would lead to an increased risk that real children would be 
violated.94  
 
For this argument to be convincing, it would need to be established that the 
knowledge that individuals wish to possess NPPIC encourages creators to create 
more NPPIC that depict real child sexual abuse, or real photographs of child 
pornography. Only then would the possessor’s behaviour encourage harm to 
children. A further related line of reasoning is that possessors of NPPIC incite 
creators of child pornography to abuse children because, through viewing NPPIC, 
their desire to view real child pornography will be increased and they will thus 
demand such material from its creators.95 But again, there is no empirical proof 
of this. Indeed, an individual may have sought NPPIC because they were lawful, 
prior to the new offence coming into force. He may have chosen to avoid real 
child pornography because he feared the consequences of breaking the law. 
Perhaps criminalising what was previously lawful might even pose a greater 
threat to children. This was an issue that troubled MP Jennifer Willott, who was 
‘concerned that we are legislating without any evidence... If the evidence 
showed that having images that were not photographic acted as a release, and 
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therefore reduced the risk of harm to children, legislating could increase the risk 
of harm.’96  
 
 To summarise, the objectification argument may offer a persuasive 
justification for criminalisation when applied to the creation and dissemination 
of NPPIC because creators and distributors propagate harmful attitudes. At a 
normative level, it is more problematic when directed at the individual who 
possesses NPPIC, unless and until there is empirical proof that the possessor 
causes direct harm to children. However, I recognise that not all liberals would 
necessarily demand proof of such direct harm. The harm stemming from 
objectification – the promotion of harmful attitudes towards children – could be 
perceived as offering a persuasive justification for criminalising the possession of 
NPPIC by liberal humanists, even if we cannot establish direct harm. For instance, 
Martha Nussbaum’s account of liberalism is one that cultivates humanity.97 That 
is, she centres the ethics of her approach on concern for others, on compassion, 
and prioritises the equal importance of each individual in liberalism.98 Echoing 
the Kantian maxim, Nussbaum emphasises that ‘[e]ach human being should be 
regarded as an end rather than as a means to the ends of others’.99 On this 
version of liberalism, since the objectification of children that NPPIC promote 
‘does not take place in a larger context of regard for humanity’100 and the images 
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depict abuse of the powerless, the possession of NPPPIC could justifiably be 
criminalised in order to avoid a cultural sanctioning of such abuse.101 Although 
this is a powerful argument for censorship, I am most persuaded by it when it is 
applied to the creation and dissemination of NPPIC rather than possession. This 
is because the criminal law should be directed at those who perpetrate harm and 
as I have argued above, it remains normatively problematic to criminalise the 
actions of the possessor because any harm he causes is indirect and remote. It is 
the creators and distributors of NPPIC who are the primary perpetrators of this 
wider conception of harm and therefore, it is criminalisation of their actions that 
can be persuasively justified on the basis of a broader version of liberalism such 
as this one.102 
 
 
REFRAMING THE OFFENCE TO BETTER TARGET HARM 
 
Following on from the analysis in the preceding section, I propose that there are 
two ways in which the NPPIC offence could be framed in order to better target 
the harms such images cause. First, applying a broader conception of harm along 
the lines of liberal humanism could justify an offence limited to the creation and 
dissemination of all NPPIC (including completely fabricated images), since this is 
behaviour which propagates harmful attitudes towards children. It is arguable 
that this broader interpretation of harm can be extended to justify criminalising 
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behaviour that causes indirect, more remote harm to children, such as the 
possession of fantasy images. But in my view, this is too much of a distortion of 
the harm principle and criminalising the possession of NPPIC on this basis is 
harder to defend at a normative level.  
 
So why did the Government elect to move straight to criminalising the 
possession of NPPIC, rather than targeting creation and distribution? Clues may 
be gleaned from the history of the legislation on indecent images of children. The 
law was first directed towards the creation and dissemination of these images 
under the PCA, before mere possession was subsequently criminalised under the 
CJA. Prior to the enactment of the CJA, police officers had called for the 
possession of indecent photographs of children to be criminalised since 
prosecutions could not be brought in some cases where material was found, but 
evidence of intended distribution was lacking.103 This may reveal something of 
the motivation for targeting possession in the context of NPPIC – possession is 
the easiest offence to prove.104 Certainly, the Government anticipated that a 
possessing NPPIC offence would catch behaviour not currently criminal under 
existing law. As stated in the C&JB’s Explanatory Notes: 
 
The publication of such material could already contravene the Obscene 
Publications Act 1959. However, the use of the internet has meant that 
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controls on the circulation of this material are easier to by-pass as 
sources may be from outside the UK or in circumstances where 
prosecution for publication is not feasible. As a result this material has a 
potentially wide public circulation.’105 
 
The new offence was thus perceived to offer a more effective means of tackling 
the circulation of NPPIC because prosecutors will not have to prove that an 
individual published such an image, but merely that it is in his possession and he 
knows this to be the case.106 As should be apparent from the discussion above, 
however, the fact remains that when behaviour does not in itself involve the 
creation of material that depicts actual child sexual abuse, or the dissemination 
of harmful or otherwise objectionable material, the matter of harm is less 
apparent. Furthermore, it appears that the Government’s main target was the 
circulation and downloading of NPPIC from the internet. During the Committee 
Stage in the House of Commons, Maria Eagle (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State for Justice) stated: ‘We need the possession offence because we are talking 
about the internet … Possession offences are a way of trying to control these 
images when the internet is the main means of distribution; otherwise we shall 
not have any control over them.’107 Yet control over the publication of obscene 
images on the internet has been extended as a consequence of case law which 
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has established that for the purposes of a prosecution under the OPA, the major 
steps in relation to publication do not have to take place within this jurisdiction. 
According to the Court of Appeal judgment in R v. Perrin,108 material is published 
for the purposes of the OPA when it is accessed in this jurisdiction. It is still 
necessary, however, for the publisher to be within this jurisdiction.109 But even if 
more control of the circulation of images on the internet is required, an offence 
of possessing NPPIC was arguably still not necessary. If the individual has 
knowledge of the content of the NPPIC, viewing and downloading such images 
from the Internet would have been caught by an offence of creating NPPIC, 
provided that judicial interpretation in cases involving indecent photographs of 
children were to be followed.110  
 
Notwithstanding this, the argument could still be made that a possession 
offence may be the only means of tackling the evils of creation and 
dissemination which the police cannot detect. Bearing this in mind, the second 
alternative way in which the offence could be reframed would be to retain it as a 
possession offence, but to include a defence if the defendant establishes that the 
image was completely fabricated.111 This would be a preferable option to simply 
restricting the ambit of the offence to NPPIC that depict the actual abuse of real 
victims or depict real children, because of the practical difficulty I alluded to in 
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the previous section. That is, it would be extremely difficult for the prosecution 
to establish that the particular NPPIC features a real child or real child sexual 
abuse. Instead, the introduction of a defence would have the following effect:  in 
a case where the defendant proves the image was completely fabricated, he will 
not have committed the offence notwithstanding that the prosecution can prove 
the possession element and that the NPPIC meets the character requirements of 
the offence. This is placing a legal rather than an evidential burden on the 
defendant; if the defendant fails to establish the image was completely 
fabricated on the balance of probabilities, then, to utilise Dennis’ wording, he 
assumes the risk of being convicted.112 It is to be contrasted with a defence that 
places an evidential burden on the defendant, such as him having to provide 
sufficient evidence to raise an issue regarding the image being completely 
fabricated since here, the burden remains on the prosecution. In the context of 
NPPIC, the latter formulation of the defence is problematic as it would produce 
the same practical difficulty for the prosecution in establishing that the particular 
NPPIC features a real child or real child sexual abuse.  
 
The difficulty with placing the legal burden on the defendant, however, is 
that this could run afoul of the presumption of innocence under Article 6(2) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).113 Although the right 
protected under Article 6(2) is not absolute, in order for a provision imposing a 
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legal burden on the defendant to be an acceptable qualification of the right, the 
provision must serve a legitimate aim and be proportionate.114 Establishing that 
the offence is in pursuance of a legitimate aim should be relatively 
straightforward considering that the goal of criminalising NPPIC through the 
reframed offence is to avoid harm to children, applying the analysis of harm 
above.115 The matter of proportionality is a harder nut to crack, but there are a 
number of arguments that can be raised to suggest that reversing the legal 
burden in this way can be viewed as proportionate. 
 
First, since the prosecution still has to prove the essential facts in issue 
(that the NPPIC meets the character requirements and that the defendant is in 
possession of the image), placing the burden of proof on the defendant 
regarding the matter of whether the NPPIC is completely fabricated may well be 
proportionate.116 Secondly, precedent indicates that if it is difficult for the 
prosecution to prove the relevant matter in the absence of a presumption of 
blameworthiness, this may be important when determining whether the 
imposition of a legal burden on the defendant is justifiable and proportionate. 
For instance, in R v Lambert, Lord Steyn referred to real difficulties for the 
prosecution posed by sophisticated drug smuggling techniques which would 
make it hard to prove that the person in possession of a container was aware of 
the contents. Objective justification for some interference with the burden of 
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proof could therefore be found.117 In the case of NPPIC, it would equally be 
difficult to ensure successful prosecution unless the defendant bears the burden; 
the sophisticated level of computer generated imagery and image manipulation 
technologies that can be used could make it impossible for the prosecution to 
determine the origin of the NPPIC in question.118 Thirdly, the offence carries a 
lower sentence than offences featuring in other cases where the legal burden 
placed on the defendant was held to be incompatible with Article 6(2).119 
 
I realise that it will be difficult for the possessor who is not the creator of 
the image to prove on the balance of probabilities that it is completely 
fabricated. But in possessing NPPIC obtained from the internet, for example, he 
is engaging in blameworthy behaviour by taking the risk that the images do 
depict real children or real child sexual abuse.120 He should thus bear the 
responsibility for taking that risk. It is possible to draw an analogy here with the 
case of R v Matthews121 and the imposition of a legal burden for an offence 
involving presumptively blameworthy conduct. According to Dennis’ analysis: ‘If 
the parameters of the offence define conduct which is presumptively 
blameworthy a reverse onus provision which requires the defendant in effect to 
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rebut the presumption by proving matters of exculpation may be justifiable.’122 
In Matthews, the offence in question was that of possessing a knife in a public 
place under s.139 of the CJA. The defendant relied on the defence under s.139(4) 
that he had good reason for having the knife, but he was convicted. On his 
appeal against conviction, it was held by the Court of Appeal that the defence 
imposed a legal burden on the defendant, but that this was justifiable 
notwithstanding its inroad into the presumption of innocence. To draw the 
parallel with possessing NPPIC, being in possession of a knife in a public place is 
criminalised to prevent a risk of harm to others. Therefore, carrying a knife in a 
public place is presumptively blameworthy because one is creating a risk of such 
harm and the defence offers the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate that 
his conduct was not blameworthy.123 Further, according to Field J, ‘the reason for 
which an accused has a bladed article in a public place is something peculiarly 
within the knowledge of the accused. We are accordingly quite satisfied that 
there is an objective justification for some derogation from the presumption of 
innocence.’124 If the possessor of an NPPIC is the creator of the image then 
similarly, he may have peculiar knowledge of whether the NPPIC is completely 
fabricated, if the technology he has used to create the NPPIC makes it difficult or 
impossible for anyone else to determine its origins. Although a possessor who is 
not the creator of the image will lack such peculiar knowledge, if he chooses to 
possess the NPPIC regardless of not knowing its origins, then he is running the 
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risk of harm that the offence targets and thus the burden of proving otherwise 
should arguably rest with him.  
 
Redrafting the offence to include a defence along the lines I am proposing 
here can be distinguished from other cases where Parliament has put a legal 
burden on the defendant to prove something the prosecution would otherwise 
have to prove. What I am suggesting is that Parliament should have limited the 
offence by putting a legal burden on the accused – if he loses, he is in no worse a 
position than the position he would be in under the new offence as drafted by 
Parliament. If he succeeds, then he is not guilty when he otherwise would have 
been guilty under the new offence. To put it another way, all the ingredients of 
the offence of possessing NPPIC are provided in the offence itself. Introducing 
the defence puts a defendant who has proof that the NPPIC is completely 
fabricated in a more favourable position.125 Further, and as a final point here, I 




THE PROBLEMATIC ELEMENTS OF THE NEW OFFENCE 
 
I now turn my analysis to the more specific, problematic elements of the new 
offence. The way in which the offence will operate and whether it can tackle the 
mischief it was designed to target is largely dependent on the way it is framed 
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(and contained) in the statute, and subsequent judicial interpretation.  
Unfortunately, there are a number of problematic elements within the 
provisions. Turning first to the definition of the character of NPPIC as ‘grossly 
offensive, disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character’, this wording is 
identical to that under the CJIA’s possession of extreme pornography offence,126 
and clearly evidences a morality based justification for criminalisation. The harm, 
or objection to NPPIC, is framed in a morality discourse and, as McGlynn and 
Rackley note, these terms are ‘highly subjective and vague’.127 Notwithstanding 
this, it is arguable that, given the moralistic climate regarding images which 
depict child sexual abuse, NPPIC would automatically be construed as ‘grossly 
offensive’ and ‘disgusting’ because of their depiction of the acts listed in the 
offence, or their focus on a child’s genital or anal area for the purpose of sexual 
arousal. Indeed, during the Committee stage of the C&JB in the House of 
Commons, MP George Howarth commented that: ‘No reasonable person doubts 
that the sorts of things set out in [the offence] are revolting. They arouse our 
understandable and natural personal distaste and revulsion.’128 Therefore, by 
their very nature, NPPIC are likely to necessarily meet the character 
requirements. This begs the question of how effective the character 
requirements will actually be in limiting the reach of the offence to images 
depicting ‘serious child sexual abuse’, the material that the Government 
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originally envisaged it would catch,129 especially given the inclusion of images 
that do not portray such abuse.130  
 
Such images will fall under the first content definition of a prohibited 
image, which does not relate to images which portray certain acts or behaviour, 
but rather, images which focus solely or principally on a child’s genitals or anal 
region. The question of whether such images have been created solely or 
principally for the purpose of sexual arousal may be harder for the jury to 
ascertain.131 It is pertinent here to look to similar definitions under the American 
and Canadian legislation on child pornography. Under the Canadian Criminal 
Code, a visual representation can be defined as child pornography if its 
‘dominant characteristic… is the depiction, for a sexual purpose, of a sexual organ 
or the anal region’ of a child.132 Material caught by American federal child 
pornography law includes images which feature the lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of a minor.133 Both of these definitions have been 
critiqued, since they require scrutiny of images featuring a naked child in order to 
ascertain whether the focal point of the image is the genital area, for the 
purposes of sexual arousal. Referring to the American law, Adler has commented 
that: ‘The law requires us to study pictures of children to uncover their potential 
sexual meanings, and in doing so, it explicitly exhorts us to take on the 
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perspective of the pedophile.’134 The danger inherent within such an approach is 
that any image of a naked child becomes suspect, leading to the sexualisation of 
the child’s naked body. This is potentially damaging to children and to artistic 
freedom of expression.135 
 
The definition under the offence, when read alongside the requirement 
that the image must have been created solely or principally for the purpose of 
sexual arousal, may catch fewer images than the definitions under Canadian and 
American law, due to the inclusion of the words ‘solely’ or ‘principally’. The 
offence should thus exclude images depicting the entire body of a naked child, 
since such images would not focus solely or principally on the child’s genital or 
anal region. This would depend, however, on how broadly or narrowly the word 
‘principally’ is interpreted. Take, for example, a computer generated image 
depicting a child whose upper body is clothed, but her genital area and legs are 
unclothed.136 Would this be an image that focuses principally on the child’s 
genital area? And if so, how would it be ascertained that it has been created 
solely or principally to sexually arouse? The context in which the image is 
possessed, even if it is possessed alongside indecent photographs of children, 
does not necessary establish that it was created for this purpose. Here arguably, 
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we would have a situation where images have to be scrutinised to uncover a 
possible sexual meaning. This may well encourage the same potentially damaging 
attitude towards the depiction of children’s naked bodies as in the US and 
Canada. 
 
Another question is whether an image would have to depict the nude 
genital or anal region of a child to fall within the ambit of the offence. In the case 
of US v Knox,137 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was required to 
consider whether video footage of girls aged between ten and seventeen, 
dancing and striking provocative poses and dressed in bathing costumes, leotards 
and underwear amounted to images featuring the lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of a minor. It was held that ‘lascivious exhibition’ meant ‘a 
depiction which displays or brings forth to view in order to attract notice to the 
genitals or pubic area of children, in order to excite lustfulness or sexual 
stimulation in the viewer’.138 The Court concluded that the genital area did not 
need to be nude or partially nude to be shown or displayed, and that judicial 
precedent did not demand a nudity requirement.139 The English offence does not 
state that NPPIC must depict nude children and consequently, if it is interpreted 
in the same way as the US provisions, the range of material that could potentially 
fall under the definition of a ‘prohibited image’ becomes even more expansive. 
Although the grossly offensive/disgusting/obscene criterion would still need to 
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be met, it may not prove to be difficult for a jury to conclude that such an image 
could meet this criterion, given the strength of moral feeling and public revulsion 
towards the sexual depiction (or perceived sexual depiction) of children that I 
alluded to above.  
 
Where does all this leave genuine works of art? The DPP was present to 
answer questions on the NPPIC provisions during part of the Committee Stage of 
the C&JB in the House of Commons. When asked what the situation would be 
regarding works of art, he responded: 
 
In so far as there are artistic considerations, they are obviously 
recognised. These provisions will inevitably fall within the framework of 
article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore, 
in so far as any interpretation is needed to comply with article 10, that 
will be done by the courts in due course. That, I anticipate, will enable 
defences to be run that are consistent with article 10.’140  
 
But given the implication from the DPP’s response that artistic considerations 
may well arise, why there is no specific defence within the actual provisions? It 
was stated in the Consultation Paper that ‘It is not [the Government’s] intention 
to capture genuine works of art’ and that the legitimate reason defence would 
apply in such cases.141 However, according to the Explanatory notes to the C&JB, 
this defence covers ‘those who can demonstrate that their legitimate business 
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means that they have a reason for possessing the image’;142 no reference is made 
to art. Without the availability of an appropriate defence, it seems, therefore, 
that artistic freedom of expression is constrained by the offence, unless a 
successful challenge is brought on the basis of a violation of Article 10 of the 
ECHR. Whilst it is possible that the character requirement that the image be 
pornographic may mean that genuine art will be excluded from the ambit of 
offence,143 there is no clearly defined boundary between pornography and art.144 
A solution to this problem could have been provided had a public good defence 
been included, as proposed by the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) in 
response to the Home Office Consultation.145 The BBFC was especially troubled 
by the potential inclusion of historic artefacts ‘including drawings, sculptures, and 
pottery from Ancient Rome or Greece, which contain non-photographic images 
of characters who appear to be children engaged in various forms of sexual 
activity’. Such items may have originally been created for pornographic purposes, 
but there is a clear reason for excluding them from the offence on the basis of 
the public good.146 
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The very wide ambit of material that may be caught by the offence was an 
issue of concern for MP Jenny Willott during the C&JB’s Committee Stage in the 
House of Commons.  Highlighting the broad nature of the definition of an image 
as a moving or still image (produced by any means), she asked the DPP whether 
her behaviour would be criminalised under the offence if she scrawled a 
pornographic image on a piece of paper.147 The DPP ‘anticipate[d] that it would 
be.’148 Moreover, the definition of an image is made even broader because the 
image does not have to be realistic, unlike material caught by the possession of 
extreme pornography offence.  
 
Furthermore, the NPPIC offence does not just encroach on freedom of 
expression but also the right to privacy, given that possession tends to be a 
private act. Indeed, whilst the C&JB was going through its parliamentary stages, 
questions were raised about the human rights implications of the proposed 
offence. The Human Rights Joint Committee was not convinced that the 
potential violation of Articles 8 and 10 could be justified, highlighting the 
offence’s potential subjectivity, its lack of precision and the Government’s failure 
to explain why it was necessary to meet the aims specified and how it was 
proportionate to those aims.149 However, in the Government’s view, the state 
could rely on the exceptions under part 2 of Arts 8 and 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights to justify the offence, and the interference with 
privacy and freedom of expression it is likely to cause:  
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 Human Rights Joint Committee, Eighth Report. Legislative Scrutiny: Coroners and Justice Bill 




[S]uch interference is plainly justified. It is intended to achieve a 
legitimate aim and is necessary to meet that aim. The provisions are a 
proportionate response to a pressing social need and any consequent 
interference with Convention rights would be in accordance with the 
law, and necessary in a democratic society for the prevention of crime, 
for the protection of morals, and for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others.150 
 
It seems likely that reliance on the protection of morals to justify state 
interference with Articles 8 and 10 would be accepted since, in the context of 
Article 10, the European Court of Human Rights has held that domestic states 
have a wide margin of appreciation regarding what state intervention is 
considered necessary to protect morals.151 But there could be grounds to 
challenge reliance on the protection of morals exception since the Government 
failed to provide any real assessment of the rationale for invoking morality based 
arguments in the context of the offence. In Handyside v UK, the European Court 
of Human Rights emphasised that: ‘The domestic margin of appreciation… goes 
hand in hand with a European supervision… Such supervision concerns both the 
aim of the measure challenged and its “necessity”…’152 
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Even assuming that reliance on the protection of morals exception is 
successful, if the Government’s aim was truly to protect children from harm, 
should reliance not primarily be based on the offence being necessary to protect 
the rights and freedoms of others? As should be apparent from the analysis in 
this paper, I am not convinced that this exception is applicable on the basis of the 
Government’s rationale for introducing the offence. I submit that the State 
would have had a much stronger case for relying on the exception under Article 8 
relating to the protection of rights and freedoms of others if it had directed the 
offence to NPPIC depicting real child sexual abuse, or featuring real children by 
means of including a defence regarding completely fabricated images. Then, 
reliance could have been placed on the harm that may be caused to children, the 
violation of their rights that possessing such NPPIC could amount to. Whilst the 
creation and dissemination of such NPPIC would arguably impinge on children’s 
rights and freedoms more greatly than possession, the state could argue that 
possession causes further psychological harm to the child who is aware that 
others are looking at a visual depiction of her sexual abuse (or what appears to 
be such). Alternatively, working on the basis of a broader conception of harm, 
the state could have had convincing grounds for relying on the same exception 
under Article 8. The harm at issue here would be that caused by the 
objectification of children in NPPIC (including completely fabricated images), and 
their encouragement of harmful attitudes towards children. But in my view, on 
this version of harm, an offence relating to creation and distribution would be 
more proportionate to the aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others 
47 
 
than one of possession, since the possessor is not propagating the harmful 
attitudes. 
 
There is a further right under the ECHR which the NPPIC offence may 
violate. Article 7, an absolute right, provides that ‘No one shall be held guilty of 
any criminal offence on account of any act… which did not constitute a criminal 
offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed.’ 
It has been recognised that the principle of legal certainty underlies this right,153 
a principle that, for practical reasons, is one of maximum certainty rather than 
absolute certainty.154 Case law suggests that uncertainty posed by one particular 
element of an offence is not problematic provided it forms part of a more 
comprehensive definition of criminalised behaviour.155 However, I have alluded 
to the vague and subjective nature of the NPPIC character requirements and the 
broad range of material that could fall under the term ‘prohibited image’. The 
uncertainty of definition thus goes far beyond one element of the NPPIC offence. 
According to the Human Rights Joint Committee: 
 
Criminal offences should be drafted in clear and accessible terms to 
ensure that individuals know how to regulate their conduct. We remain 
concerned at the broad definition of the offence and, as a result, its 
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potential application beyond the people whom the Government is 
seeking to target.156 
 
Not only is it difficult to justify the offence on the basis of the classical liberal 
harm principle, therefore, the Government has drafted an offence with 
expansive, ill-defined descriptors which may well violate human rights and that 






The purpose of the C&JA ‘is to establish more effective, transparent and 
responsive justice and coroner services for victims, witnesses, bereaved families 
and the wider public’ and in part, it seeks to achieve this by ‘updating parts of the 
criminal law to improve its clarity, fairness and effectiveness’.157 Quite how 
extending the reach of the criminal law to capture NPPIC is related to this 
purpose is unclear, to say the least. A sceptic might wonder whether the C&JB 
offered the Government an opportunity to quietly introduce a proposal that 
would undoubtedly have attracted more publicity had it appeared alongside and 
at the same time as other provisions that highlight the increased criminalisation 
of the possession of pornographic material, such as the recent offence relating to 
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extreme adult pornography. As colourfully expressed by MP David Howarth in 
reference to the C&JB:  
 
[A] principle of legislative drafting that the Bill seems to follow is that of 
the red rag and the smuggle. A red rag is a provision in a Bill that is 
designed to attract the attention of hot-headed Members of this House, 
and about which the Government do not, in reality, care very much 
either way, while they smuggle in, largely unnoticed and unchallenged, a 
lot of significant stuff that otherwise might attract severe criticism.158 
 
There is a crucial difference between, on the one hand, real child pornography 
that depicts the actual sexual abuse of children and, on the other, completely 
fabricated images that do not cause harm to an actual child. According to a 
spokesperson for the Children’s Charity NCH, speaking in 2008, the Government’s 
move to criminalise NPPIC ‘makes a clear statement that drawings or computer-
generated images of child abuse are as unacceptable as a photograph’.159 I 
contend that perceiving fantasy NPPIC to be as unacceptable, or indeed, as 
harmful as images of real pornography, seriously underplays the physical and 
psychological damage that children who feature in real child pornography suffer. 
The harm caused by real child pornography is concrete and undeniable. In 
contrast, the harm caused by NPPIC is much less verifiable and no attempt to 
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measure harm was made by the Government prior to the introduction of the 
proposed offence in the C&JB. Indeed, the Human Rights Joint Committee 
concluded that: 
 
The Government has stated that the offence is needed to protect 
children and vulnerable adults and to fill a gap in the law. However… it 
has provided no concrete evidence to demonstrate the need for the new 
offence. We reiterate our view… that legislation should be evidence-
based. Such evidence should be published in time to assist 
parliamentary scrutiny. Whilst we fully support appropriately targeted 
criminal offences which will [protect] children from abuse, itself a gross 
violation of their human rights, we are disappointed that the 
Government has failed to provide sufficiently weighty reasons for the 
need of the new offence…160 
 
Couple this with the Government’s prediction that the number of prosecutions 
under the offence will be low,161 and the perceived justification for its 
introduction may become even more questionable. However, if the possession of 
NPPIC does cause significant harm, then the fact that the offence will not be 
frequently utilised should not, in itself, suggest criminalisation is inappropriate. 
So where does the analysis of harm that I have undertaken leave the offence? 
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With regards to the morality based rationale pertaining to offence to 
others, I have argued that the bare knowledge offence caused by the private 
possession of NPPIC, even if profound, can only justify criminalisation on the 
basis of legal moralism, since it does not constitute a wrong to the offended 
parties. The moral harm argument relating to depravity and corruption would 
have to be applied on a paternalistic basis to legitimate criminalisation, given 
that the offence criminalises possession rather than publication or dissemination. 
And in applying this rationale to an individual who has created the image he is in 
possession of, we would have to accept that it is possible for someone to be 
recorrupted by his pre-existing depraved thoughts when these thoughts are 
transferred into an image. Otherwise, the act of possessing such an image would 
not be the cause of his depravity and corruption. I would question whether even 
a legal moralist or fundamental moral paternalist would be won over by these 
rickety morality based rationales for the offence. 
 
Returning to the matter of harm, to reiterate, harm may be caused to 
children by NPPIC that depict real child sexual abuse, and images that depict the 
fantasy sexual abuse of a real, recognisable child. Adopting a liberal humanist 
approach, the objectification argument supports the case for criminalising all 
NPPIC, although normatively, it provides a more justifiable basis for prohibiting 
the creation and distribution of NPPIC, given that those who possess NPPIC do 
not propagate harmful attitudes towards children. It is extremely difficult to find 
a legitimate basis for criminalising the possession of fantasy NPPIC through a 
reasoned application of the harm principle. If the Government had wanted to 
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present the most legitimate case for criminalisation on the basis of harm to 
children, then the offence should have been directed to NPPIC featuring real 
children or real child sexual abuse by including a defence regarding fantasy, 
completely fabricated images. In drafting these provisions without such a 
defence and adopting this broad-brush approach, it seems that the legislature is 
either relying on harm without any proof or reasoned analysis of harm, and/or 
has deemed that legal moralism provides sufficient grounds to warrant 
criminalisation.  
 
This poses, or should pose, real concerns in a liberal society, not least 
because of the human rights concerns that I have discussed and the extremely 
broad law-making power with which this basis for criminalisation provides 
legislators. And such an approach is likely to result in the creation of further 
offences. In the context of material which relates to child sexual abuse, it could 
lead to calls to criminalise written, fictitious material that is deemed to be 
indecent rather than obscene and thus not caught by the OPA, the offences 
relating to indecent photographs of children, or the new NPPIC offence. The 
questions that should be asked are whether criminal law’s escalating intervention 
is likely to offer any better protection to children, and how far we are prepared 
to move away from the persuasive classical liberal harm-based rationale of 
criminalising images of real child pornography.  
